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DISCRIMINATION, DEATH AND DENIAL: THE
TOLERANCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
INFLICTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Stephen B. Bright*
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment, one of America's most prominent
vestiges of slavery and racial violence, is flourishing once
again in the United States. After a moratorium on execu-
tions in the 1960s and '70s, the execution of human beings by
the state has become "routine." Over 3,000 men, women and
children are on death rows throughout the nation waiting to
be electrocuted, injected, shot, hung or gassed.'
Those being executed and awaiting their deaths are no
different from those selected for execution in the past: virtu-
ally all are poor; about half are members of racial minorities;
and the overwhelming majority were sentenced to death for
crimes against white victims.2 Many suffer from severe
mental impairments or limitations and many others were the
victims of the most brutal physical, sexual and psychological
abuse during their childhoods.
3
The death penalty was declared unconstitutional in 1972
due to arbitrariness and discrimination against racial minor-
* Director, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia; Visiting
Lecturer in Law, Harvard and Yale Law Schools. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of Kentucky. The author has represented persons facing the death penalty
at trials, on appeals, and in post conviction proceedings since 1979. This article
draws upon those experiences as well as the authorities cited.
1. Death Row U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INc., at 1 (Sum-
mer 1995) (reporting that there were 3,028 persons under sentence of death as
of Aug. 31, 1995).
2. Id. at 1, 3 (reporting that over half of those under death sentence are
African-American, Latino, Native American or Asian, and that in 82 percent of
the cases in which executions have been carried out, the victims were white).
3. See, e.g., Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological and
Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United
States, 145 Am. JuR. Psy. 838 (1986). The author has observed the presence of
these factors, virtually without exception, in capital cases he has handled and
supervised, as well as in cases in which he has consulted other lawyers.
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ities and the poor.4 New capital punishment laws, suppos-
edly designed to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination,
were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976.r But race and
poverty continue to determine who dies. The poor are fre-
quently represented by inept court-appointed lawyers, who
often fail to protect the rights of their clients and fail to pro-
vide juries with critical information needed for the sentencing
decision, leaving the accused virtually defenseless.6 Prosecu-
tors are given wide discretion in deciding whether to seek the
death penalty and juries are given great discretion in decid-
ing whether to impose it. This discretion provides ample
room for racial prejudice to influence whether the accused
lives or dies.
Although African-Americans are the victims in half of
the murders that occur each year in the United States, 7
eighty-five percent of the condemned were sentenced to death
for murders of white persons.8 An analysis of twenty-eight
studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office found a "re-
markably consistent" pattern of racial disparities in capital
sentencing throughout the county.9 A study in 1994 of death
sentences in Harris County, Texas, which has carried out
more executions and sentenced more people to death than
most states, 10 found that "Harris County has sent blacks to
death row nearly twice as often as whites during the last ten
years, a growing imbalance that eclipses the pre-civil rights
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
6. For a discussion of the impact of poverty on the imposition of the death
penalty due to the quality of representation provided by court-appointed coun-
sel, see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
7. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 384, table 3.128 (Kathleen Maguire &
Ann L. Pastore eds., 1993).
8. See supra note 2.
9. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (Feb. 1990).
10. At the end of February 1995, 37 persons sentenced to death in Harris
County had been executed, more than in any state except Texas. Harris County
accounts for 113 persons on Texas' death row awaiting lethal injection. Tamar
Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even Within States It Varies, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1995, at Al, A13. Only eleven states besides Texas have over 100 per-
sons under death sentence. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 1.
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days of 'Old Sparky' the notorious Texas electric chair."" In
Florida, which has the nation's third largest death row,"2 the
Racial and Ethnic Bias Commission of the Florida Supreme
Court found that "the application of the death penalty in
Florida is not colorblind."' 3 A Congressional study found
stark disparities in the use of the federal death penalty. "
4
Racial disparities have been documented by other
observers. '5
11. Bryan Denson, Death Penalty: Equal Justice? THE HOUSTON POST, Oct.
16, 1994, at Al.
12. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 1, at 18 (stating there are 341 people on
Florida's death row).
13. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL
AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, at xvi (Dec. 11, 1991). See also Michael L.
Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455
(Fla. 1992) (affirming refusal to hold hearing on claim of racial discrimination
where evidence proffered showed prosecutors in Bay County State Attorney's
office were four times more likely to charge first degree murder in cases involv-
ing white victims than cases involving black victims; that of such cases that
went to trial, first degree murder convictions were 26 times more likely in cases
with white victims; and that even though blacks constituted 40% of the murder
victims in Bay County between 1975 and 1987, all 17 death sentences that were
imposed were for homicides involving white victims).
14. STAFF REPORT BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS 1988-1994, H.R.
458, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. at 2 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter House Subcommittee,
Racial Disparities in Federal Death Penalty Prosecutions].
15. In addition to the studies cited by the General Accounting Office in its
report, supra note 9, see DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMI-
NATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Bob Levenson &
Debbie Salamore, Prosecutors See Death Penalty in Black and White, THE OR.
LANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 1992, at Al (reporting that "[j]ustice ... is not color-
blind in Central Florida when it comes to the prosecution of first degree murder
cases"); Jim Henderson and Jack Taylor, Killers of Dallas Blacks Escape the
Death Penalty, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Nov. 17, 1985, at 1 (accompanied by
other stories and charts demonstrating the relationship between race and impo-
sition of the death sentence); David Margolick, In the Land of Death Penalty,
Accusations of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at Al (describing racial
disparities in the infliction of the death penalty in Georgia's Chattahoochee Ju-
dicial Circuit, which includes the city of Columbus); Paul Pinkham & Robin
Lowenthal, The Color of Justice in Jacksonville: Killers of Blacks get off Easier
than Killers of Whites, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 8, 1991, at Dl. Thomas
J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder
Trials: 1976-1991, paper presented to Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences,
Chicago (1994) (finding that Blacks accused of killing whites had a higher than
average probability of being charged with a capital crime by the prosecutor and
being sentenced to death by the jury).
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Few people familiar with the state of race relations in the
United States today would deny that there is a risk of racial
prejudice influencing the sentencing decision in the typical
capital case: an African-American facing the death penalty
for the murder of a prominent white person who is prosecuted
by a white prosecutor before a white judge and an all-white or
predominantly white jury. The likelihood of racial prejudice
influencing whether the death penalty is sought by the prose-
cutor or imposed by the jury is even greater if other factors
are present, such as the rape of a white woman. 6
The United States Supreme Court has observed, "a juror
who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally infer-
ior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding
whether [the] crime involved aggravating factors ... ."17 In
addition, a juror's racial biases might prevent him or her
from considering evidence about the life and background of
the accused in mitigation. The Court pointed out, for exam-
ple, that "[s]uch a juror might also be less favorably inclined
toward [the defendant's] evidence of mental disturbance as a
mitigating circumstance."'"
The Supreme Court also observed that "[mWore subtle,
less consciously held racial attitudes"-unconscious racism-
"could also influence a juror's decision in [the] case."' 9 For
example, "[flear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by
the violent facts of [the] crime, might incline a juror to favor
the death penalty."2 °
16. There has been a particularly pronounced racial disparity in the inflic-
tion of the death penalty for rape of white victims by African-Americans. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 n.149 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 145 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262
(1970).
17. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1976).
18. Id.
19. Id. See also United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir.
1986) (observing that an individual may harbor "certain negative stereotypes
which, despite his protestations to the contrary, may well prevent him or her
from making decisions solely on the facts and the law that our jury system
requires.").
20. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35. The way in which such racial prejudice may
come into play in decision-making has been described in detail by many schol-
ars. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1571
(1989) (describing the tendency of people to make decisions based on "racial
stereotypes and assumptions"); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (documenting tendency among whites
to convict black defendants in instances where white defendants would be ac-
quitted); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of
436 [Vol. 35
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Although the Supreme Court spoke of jurors, racial prej-
udice is not limited to jurors. Law enforcement officials, pros-
ecutors, judges, defense lawyers, and court officials may have
racial biases which influence their attitudes toward crimes
and those accused, as well as their exercise of discretion in
the process leading to imposition of a death sentence.
A prosecutor who believes that "blacks are violence prone
or morally inferior"2 1 may be less likely to seek the death pen-
alty in cases involving African-American victims and more
likely to seek the death penalty in cases involving African-
American defendants. A prosecutor's unconscious racism, his
or her fear or misunderstanding of people of a different race
or culture, may well be "stirred up" in a case involving an
interracial crime and influence the prosecutor to seek the
death penalty in that case, but not in similar cases that are
not interracial.
A judge with similar attitudes may fail to recognize or
correct racial discrimination by prosecutors in selecting ju-
ries, in seeking the death penalty, or in presenting evidence
or argument. A defense lawyer who has racial biases may not
spend enough time with the client or the client's family to
discover mitigating evidence. An African-American client
may be seen as "arrogant" or "uncooperative" due to the law-
yer's racial stereotypes.22 A lawyer may not diligently try to
save the life of one believed to be inferior.
Racial discrimination often influences the capital sen-
tencing decision in other ways as well. Members of racial mi-
norities continue to be excluded as judges, jurors, prosecu-
tors, lawyers, and law enforcement officials in the criminal
Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 708 (1989) (describing the psy-
chological tendency of predominantly white decision makers to sympathize
more with whites than blacks); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence, The ID, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Francis C.
Dane & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Charac-
teristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTRooM 104-06
(1982) (reporting that identification with a victim is particularly pronounced
and results in the most severe sentences where the victim is of the same race,
and the defendant is of a different race from that of the jurors).
21. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1976).
22. See e.g., Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(describing that a court-appointed defense lawyer, after admitting his belief
that blacks are less intelligent than whites and have inferior morals, character-
ized his client as "arrogant" and "uncooperative"), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1519 (11th
Cir. 1991), remanded on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
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justice system. A member of a racial minority who is also
poor faces the disadvantage in a capital prosecution of being
represented by a court-appointed lawyer. In many states, de-
fense lawyers are appointed by elected trial judges, many of
whom are former prosecutors who won positions on the bench
after prosecuting high publicity capital cases. Often, court-
appointed lawyers lack the knowledge, skill, resources, sensi-
tivity and inclination to handle the case.23 These lawyers
may fail to recognize and challenge the role that race plays in
determining who dies.24
While it is difficult to measure precisely the extent to
which race influences decision-making in any particular capi-
tal case, only those oblivious to the brutal history of racial
discrimination in American law25 would deny the danger of
racial prejudice entering the decisions which lead to the im-
position of a death sentence. However, instead of undertak-
ing the challenge of minimizing or eliminating the potential
for racial prejudice in these highly subjective and emotional
decisions, courts and legislatures have been largely indiffer-
ent to the influence of race in the infliction of the death pen-
alty. Despite pronounced racial disparities in the infliction of
the death penalty in both state and federal capital cases,
Congress and state legislatures have failed to limit applica-
tion of the death penalty or provide remedies for racial dis-
crimination, such as the Racial Justice Act.26
Instead of acknowledging the risk of racial discrimina-
tion and attempting to identify and eliminate it, both federal
and state courts frequently dodge the inquiry. They deny the
existence of racial discrimination that is apparent to every-
one, employ legal fictions that have no relation to the reality
of race relations in America today, set legal standards or bur-
23. See generally Bright, supra note 6.
24. See infra notes 200, 261-64 and accompanying text (describing the fail-
ure of court-appointed lawyers to challenge discrimination against African-
Americans in composition of jury pools).
25. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (3d ed. 1992);
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS (1978).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 186-191. The Racial Justice Act was
passed by the House of Representatives as part of the 1994 Crime Bill, but was
rejected in the Senate version of the bill. It was not included in the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994), which was signed into law on September 14, 1994. 55 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2305 (Aug. 31, 1994)
1 [Vol. 35438
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dens of proof that are impossible to meet, or provide wholly
inadequate remedies for discrimination that is undeniable.
All this may be done while the courts are issuing sweeping
pronouncements decrying the evil of racial discrimination
and proclaiming their "unceasing efforts" to cure it. 2 7 One
prominent federal appellate judge observed that the failure of
the courts to remedy instances of racial discrimination has
sent the message that federal courts, which once offered the
greatest hope to the nation's minorities, are "no longer inter-
ested in protecting the rights of minorities."
28
This article examines the historic relationship between
racial violence and the death penalty, describes some of the
ways in which racial prejudice continues to influence capital
sentencing decisions, and discusses the failure of the courts
to confront the racial bias that infects the criminal justice
system.
II. "LEGAL LyNcHINGS"
The death penalty is a direct descendant of lynching and
other forms of racial violence and racial oppression in
America. From colonial times until the Civil War, the crimi-
nal law in many states expressly differentiated between
crimes committed by and against blacks and whites. 29 For
example, Georgia law provided that the rape of a white fe-
male by a black man "shall be" punishable by death, while
the rape of a white female by anyone else was punishable by
a prison term not less than two nor more than twenty years.30
The rape of a black woman was punishable "by fine and im-
prisonment, at the discretion of the court."3 '
Disparate punishments-exacted by the courts and by
the mob-based upon both the race of the victim and the race
27. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309, 333 (1987) (describing
"unceasing efforts" while finding that racial disparities in capital sentencing do
not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 504 n.2, 511 (1990) (reiterating the "earnestness" of the Court's "commit-
ment to racial justice" while holding that the prosecutorial use of peremptory
strikes against African-Americans did not violate the Sixth Amendment's right
to an impartial jury).
28. Stephen Reinhardt, Riots, Racism, and the Courts, quoted in HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1992, at 15, 16.
29. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE IN THE
AMERicAN LEGAL PROCESS 256 (1978).
30. Id.
31. Id. See also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 329-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1995] 439
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of the defendant continued in practice after the abolition of
slavery. At least 4,743 people were killed by lynch mobs. 2
More than ninety percent of the lynchings took place in the
South, and three-fourths of the victims were African-Ameri-
cans.33 The threat that Congress might pass an anti-lynch-
ing statute in the early 1920s led Southern states to "replace
lynchings with a more '[humane] ... method of racial con-
trol'-the judgment and imposition of capital sentences by
all-white juries."34 As one historian observed:
Southerners ... discovered that lynchings were untidy
and created a bad press .... [L]ynchings were increas-
ingly replaced by situations in which the Southern legal
system prostituted itself to the mob's demand. Responsi-
ble officials begged would-be lynchers to 'let the law take
its course,' thus tacitly promising that there would be a
quick trial and the death penalty .... [Sluch proceedings
'retained the essence of mob murder, shedding only its
outward forms'.3 5
The process of "legal lynchings" was so successful that in the
1930s, two-thirds of those executed were black. 6
Powell v. Alabama,3 7 decided by the Supreme Court in
1932, involved nine young African-Americans who were
charged in Scottsboro, Alabama, with the rape of two white
women, the classic case for a lynching or the death penalty.38
The youths were tried in groups in three trials while mobs
outside the courtroom demanded the death penalty.3 9 The
accused were represented by two lawyers; one was a drunk
and the other was senile.40 All-white, all-male juries sen-
32. These numbers come from the archives at Tuskegee University, where
lynchings have been documented since 1882. Mark Curriden, The Legacy of
Lynching, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 15, 1995, at M1.
33. Id.
34. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment
as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 80 (1990) (quoting MICHAEL BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN
ORDER 22-26 (1987)).
35. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 115
(rev. ed. 1992).
36. Colbert, supra note 34, at 80.
37. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
38. For excellent accounts of the case of the "Scottsboro boys," see JAMES
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994); and CARTER, supra note 35.
39. CARTER, supra note 35, at 20-48.
40. Id. at 18-19, 22.
[Vol. 35440
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tenced the accused to death.4" When there was a national
outcry about the injustice of such summary trials with only
perfunctory legal representation, the people of Scottsboro did
not understand the reaction. After all, they did not lynch the
accused; they gave them a trial.42
In one of many examples of legal lynchings, a man was
hung immediately after a trial in Kentucky that lasted less
than an hour.43 The Louisville Courier-Journal "tried to put
the best light on the execution," saying that although it was a
little hasty, at least there was not a lynching.44 The paper
also observed that since a Negro had raped a white woman,
"no other result could have been reached, however prolonged
the trial."45
As racial violence was achieved increasingly through the
criminal courts, Georgia became the nation's primary execu-
tioner, carrying out the most executions in the twentieth cen-
tury before the death penalty was declared unconstitutional
in 1972.4 1 Between 1924 and 1972, Georgia executed 337
black people and 75 white people.47
The death penalty was held unconstitutional in Furman
v. Georgia48 because of discrimination and arbitrariness in its
infliction.49 New death penalty statutes were enacted almost
41. Id. at 20-48; Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
42. CARTER, supra note 35 at 104-16; GOODMAN, supra note 38 at 47-50,
297-98.
43. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTucKY 1865-1940; LYNCH-
INGS, MOB RULE, AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" 252 (1990).
44. Id. at 253. The editorial read as follows: "The fact, however, that Ken-
tucky was saved the mortification of a lynching by an indignant multitude,
bent upon avenging the innocent victim of the crime, is a matter for special
congratulation." Id.
45. Id. Wright describes other legal lynchings in Kentucky. Id. at 251-305.
46. The Pace of Executions: Since 1976 ... and Through History, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, § 4, at 3. Georgia carried out 673 executions between 1900
and the end of 1994, the most of any state during this period. Id.
47. Prentice Palmer & Jim Galloway, Georgia Electric Chair Spans 5 De-
cades, THE ATLANTA J., Dec. 15, 1983, at 15A. After adopting electrocution as a
means of execution in 1924, Georgia put more people to death than any state
and "set national records for executions over a 20-year period in the 1940s and
1950s." Id.
48. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
49. The five justices that made up the majority in Furman concluded that
the death penalty was being imposed so discriminatorily, id. at 249-52 (Doug-
las, J., concurring), id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), id. at 364-66 (Marshall,
J., concurring), so arbitrarily, id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring), id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring), and so infrequently, id. at 311 (White, J., concurring),
that any given death sentence was cruel and unusual. Justice Brennan also
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immediately by a number of states.50 Some of those statutes
were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976."' However, the
new statutes have failed to end the influence of racial preju-
dice in the use of the death penalty.
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AFTER FURMAN
Most death penalty schemes adopted by the states after
Furman v. Georgia provide for the death penalty in most first
degree and felony murders. Any murder involving a robbery,
arson, burglary, rape, or kidnapping may be prosecuted as a
capital case.5 2 In addition, death may be imposed for any
other "heinous, atrocious or cruel" 3 or "horrible" murders,5 '
which of course describe almost all murders. But no crime-
no matter how heinous-must be punished by death. In most
states, the sentence is determined by the imprecise and
wholly subjective consideration of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors. The breadth of the death penalty statutes and
the unfettered discretion given to prosecutors and juries pro-
vide ample room for racial prejudice to influence whether
concluded that because "the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the
State is uniquely degrading to human dignity," it is inconsistent with "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at 291, 270.
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 & n.23 (1976) (noting that at
least 35 states passed death penalty statutes).
51. The Supreme Court upheld the statutes enacted by Florida, Georgia
and Texas. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court struck down the
statutes adopted by North Carolina and Louisiana. Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The first
execution after the Supreme Court allowed the resumption of capital punish-
ment was in 1977, when Gary Gilmore was killed by a firing squad in Utah.
Jon Nordheimer, Gilmore is Executed After Stay is Upset; 'Let's Do It?' he said,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1977, at Al.
52. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1, 17-10-30 (Michie 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1994). For a
summary of capital offenses by state, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 1993 Table 1, at 5 (Dec. 1994). Under many capital statutes,
the death penalty may also be imposed for the murder of a police or correctional
officer, contract murders, murders related to drug offenses, and murders com-
mitted by persons with a previous conviction for a violent crime. Id.
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (Michie 1994).
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death is sought or imposed.5 5 As a result, "[riace plays an
especially influential role in capital sentencing decisions."5 6
The criminal courts are the institutions least affected by
the Civil Rights Movement that brought changes to many
American institutions in the last forty years. Judges and
prosecutors are still elected in judicial circuits that are drawn
to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities.5 7 Thus,
even in many areas with substantial minority populations,
all of the judges and prosecutors are white.58 In Georgia, for
example, all of the elected district attorneys are white.5 9
Many other states also have no or very few African-Ameri-
cans as prosecutors.6 0 Members of racial minorities are often
underrepresented in jury pools and excluded in the jury selec-
61tion process. Often, the only member of a racial minority
who participates in the process is the accused. Racial dispari-
ties are still apparent in all types of sentencing.62 The per-
55. The Supreme Court has observed that "[b]ecause of the range of discre-
tion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique oppor-
tunity for racial prejudice to operate .... " Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35
(1985). However, as will be discussed in part IV, infra, the Court has refused to
require procedures and remedies adequate to identify and cure the influence of
race.
56. Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1351 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
57. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1484, 1537-41 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
League of United Latin American Citizens, Counsel No. 434 v. Clements, 999
F.2d 831, 904-18 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 878 (1994). Ruth Marcus, Does Voting Rights Law Cover Judicial
Elections?, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1991, at A4.
58. Mark Curriden, Racism Mars Justice in U.S. Panel Reports, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Aug. 11, 1991, at D1, D3 (observing that only 6 of Georgia's 134 Su-
perior Court judges were African-American, and those 6 were in 3 judicial cir-
cuits); ASSOCIATED PRESS, Second Black Alabama Supreme Court Justice Sworn
In, COLUMBUS (GA.) LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Nov. 2, 1993, at B2 (noting that there
was only 1 African-American among Alabama's 17 appellate court judges, and
only 12 blacks among the state's 255 circuit and district court judges); Rorie
Sherman, Is Mississippi Turning?, NAT'L. L. J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, 24 (only 2.6
* % of all state court judges in the United States are black).
59. Mark Curriden, Racism Mars Justice in U.S. Panel Reports, supra note
58, at D3.
60. JESSE SMITH & ROBERT JOHNS, EDS., STATISTICAL RECORD OF BLACK
AMERICA 774-75 (3d ed. 1995) (after listing the number of African-Americans as
judges, magistrates and justices of the peace, showing no African-American for
"other judicial officials" for Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas).
61. American Bar Association Task Force on Minorities and the Justice
System, Achieving Justice in a Diverse America at 15 (1992).
62. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (finding equal
protection violation due to more severe sentences imposed for possession of
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functory capital trial-the legal lynching-is not a thing of
the past. Those facing the death penalty still receive token
representation by court-appointed lawyers in cases infected
by racism.
A. Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in the Criminal
Courts
Wilburn Dobbs, an African-American who faces execu-
tion in Georgia for the murder of a white man, was referred to
at his trial as "colored" and "colored boy" by the judge and
defense lawyer and called by his first name by the prosecu-
tor.63 Two of the jurors who sentenced Dobbs to death for the
murder admitted after trial to using the racial slur "nigger."
64
Dobbs was tried only two weeks after being indicted for mur-
der and four other offenses. Dobbs was assigned a court-ap-
pointed lawyer who did not know for certain until the day of
trial that he was going to represent Dobbs.6 5 The lawyer filed
crack cocaine than for powdered cocaine where 96.6% of those charged with
possession of crack cocaine are black and 79.6% of those charged with posses-
sion of powdered cocaine are white); Stephens v. State, No S94A1854, 1995 WL
116292 (Ga. S. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), withdrawn and superseded, Stephens v.
State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995) (stating that of 375 persons serving life
sentences for a second conviction for sale or possession with intent to distribute
certain narcotics, 98.4% are African-Americans). See, e.g., Samuel Myers, Jr.,
Racial Disparity in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination
in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781 (1993); Gary Kieck, Racial Discrimi-
nation in Criminal Sentencing, 46 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 783 (1981); Dennis
Cauchon, Sentences for Crack Called Racist, USA TODAY, May 26, 1993, at 1A;
Curriden, supra note 58 at Dl; Ruth Marcus, Racial Bias Widely Seen in Crimi-
nal Justice System, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at A4; Richard A. Berk & Alec
Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los An-
geles, 6 Fed. Sent. Rt. 36 (1993); Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson,
Why Did Racial /Ethnic Sentencing Differences in Federal District Courts Grow
Larger Under the Guidelines?, 6 Fed. Sent. R. 223 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree,
The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 Fed. Sent. R. 229 (1994);
Rhonda Cook, Sentence Disparities are the Rule in Ga., ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Dec. 3, 1990, at Al; Tracy Thompson, Blacks Sent to Jail More Than Whites for
Same Crimes, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 30, 1989, at 1A (with related stories
and charts); Tracy Thompson, Justice in Toombs Circuit not Colorblind, Some
Say, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1987, at 1A (three other articles appeared
on the following days).
63. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 963 F.2d
1403 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
64. Id. at 1576.
65. Trial counsel testified "[t]here was uncertainty all the way up until the
trial began as to whether or not I would represent him." Transcript of State
Habeas Corpus Hearing of Sept. 28, 1977, at 55, included in Record on Appeal,
Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 113 S. Ct.
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only one motion, a demand for a copy of the accusation and a
list of witnesses.66 Counsel sought a continuance on the
morning of trial,6 7 stating to the trial court that he was "not
prepared to go to trial"68 and he was "in a better position to
prosecute the case than defend it." 69 Nevertheless, the trial
court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial.70
The federal district court described the defense lawyer's atti-
tude towards African-Americans as follows:
Dobbs' trial attorney was outspoken about his views.
He said that many blacks are uneducated and would not
make good teachers, but do make good basketball players.
He opined that blacks are less educated and less intelli-
gent than whites either because of their nature or because
"my granddaddy had slaves." He said that integration
has led to deteriorating neighborhoods and schools and re-
ferred to the black community in Chattanooga as "black
boy jungle." He strongly implied that blacks have inferior
morals by relating a story about sex in a classroom. He
also said that when he was young, a maid was hired with
the understanding that she would steal some items. He
said that blacks in Chattanooga are more troublesome
than blacks in Walker County [Georgia]....
The attorney stated that he uses the word "nigger"
jokingly.7 1
Dobbs was convicted and sentenced to death in a trial
that lasted only three days. During the penalty phase of
Dobbs' trial, when the jury could have heard anything about
his life, background and any reasons Dobbs should not have
been sentenced to death,72 the lawyer presented no evi-
835 (1993). Defense counsel testified before the federal court: "As a matter of
fact, I didn't know for sure what he was going to be tried for." Transcript of
trial at 85, included as part of the Record on Appeal in Dobbs, 963 F.2d 1403.
66. Record on Appeal to Georgia Supreme Court at 24, included in the Rec-
ord on Appeal in Dobbs, 963 F.2d 1403.
67. Transcript of trial at 2, included in the Record on Appeal in Dobbs, 963
F.2d 1403.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 1577.
72. Any aspect of the life and background of the accused may be considered
by the sentencer as a reason to impose a sentence less than death. Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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dence. 73 For a closing argument he read part of Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,74 which ex-
pressed the view that the death penalty was unconstitutional
and could not be carried out.75 Thus, rather than emphasiz-
ing to the jury the enormous decision it had to make about
whether Dobbs was going to live or die, the lawyer suggested
that because the death penalty would never be carried out,
the jury's decision was not important.76
The federal courts determined that the racial prejudice of
the judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer and jurors in the Dobbs
case did not require his death sentence to be set aside. The
Court of Appeals found that "[a]lthough certain of jurors'
statements revealed racial prejudice, no juror stated that [he
or she] viewed blacks as more prone to violence than whites,"
or as morally inferior to whites.77 Since neither the trial
judge nor defense lawyer decided the penalty, the Court held
that "apart from the trial judge's and defense lawyer's refer-
ences to Dobbs as 'colored' and 'colored boy,' it cannot be said
that the trial judge's or the defense lawyer's racial attitudes
affected the jurors' sentencing determination."78 After a re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court,7 9 the district
court again held that Wilburn Dobbs did not receive incompe-
tent representation despite the lawyer's racism.80
Dobbs is only one of many cases that starkly illustrates
that racial discrimination not acceptable in any other area of
American life today is tolerated in criminal courts. The use of
a racial slur may cost a sports announcer his job,8 ' but there
have been capital cases in which judges, jurors and defense
counsel have called an African-American defendant a "nig-
73. Transcript of trial at 503-05, included as part of the Record on Appeal
in Dobbs, 963 F.2d 1403.
74. 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972).
75. Transcript of Closing Argument, included as part of the Record on Ap-
peal in Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991).
76. A prosecutor is not allowed to make an argument which would diminish
the jury's sense of responsibility for its life and death decision. See Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1985).
77. Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1407 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd and re-
manded, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
78. Id. at 1407-08.
79. Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993) (per curiam).
80. Dobbs v. Zant, N.D. Ga. No. 4:80-cv-247-HLM (Order of July 29, 1994).
81. See CBS Drops Commentator, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1988, at Al. See also
Richard Harwood, Pressure from the 'Isms,' WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1990, at C6;
Racial Remarks Cost Dodger Official His Job, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1987 at Al.
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ger" with no repercussions for anyone except the accused.
For example, parents of an African-American defendant were
referred to as the "nigger mom and dad" by the judge in a
Florida case.8 2 The judge did not lose his job; the Florida
Supreme Court merely suggested that judges should avoid
the "appearance" of impropriety in the future.
8 3
Similarly, a death sentence was upheld in a Georgia case
where jurors used racial slurs during their deliberations. 84
The court reasoned that the evidence "shows only that two of
the twelve jurors possessed some racial prejudice and does
not establish that racial prejudice caused those two jurors to
vote to convict [the defendant] and sentence him to die."8 5 No
state or federal court so much as held a hearing on the racial
prejudice which infected the sentencing of Henry Hance
before he was executed by Georgia in 1994, even though ju-
rors signed affidavits swearing racial slurs had been used
during deliberations.8 6 In at least five capital cases in Geor-
gia, the accused were referred to with racial slurs by their
own lawyers at some time during the court proceedings.8 7
It is the publicly announced policy of Ed Peters, the Dis-
trict Attorney of Jackson, Mississippi, to "get rid of as many"
black citizens as possible when exercising his peremptory
strikes to select a jury.88 As a result of this "policy" by a gov-
ernment official, Leo Edwards, an African-American, was
sentenced to death by an all-white jury, even though he was
82. Peek v. Florida, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986).
83. Id.
84. Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960
(1991).
85. Id. at 185.
86. Hance v. Zant, Super. Ct. of Butts Co., Ga., No. 93-V-172 (affidavits of
juror Patricia LeMay & Gayle Lewis Daniels). See also Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d
940 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); Bob Herbert, Mr. Hance's 'Perfect Punishment',
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at D17; Bob Herbert, Jury Room Injustice, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at A15.
87. Charlie Young, Curfew Davis, George Dungee, Terry Lee Goodwin and
Eddie Lee Ross were all referred to as "niggers" by their defense lawyers at
some point in the trials during which they were sentenced to death. Transcript
of Opening and Closing Arguments, Dungee v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir
1985), decided sub nom. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794,805 n.13 (11th
Cir. 1982). See also Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (defense counsel referred to his own client, a Salvadoran man, as a "wet
back" in front of all-white jury).
88. Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1988).
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tried in a community which was thirty-four percent African-
American. 9 The federal courts rejected Edwards' challenge
to Peters' discrimination 90 and Edwards was executed in
1989. 91 In what other area of American life may a public offi-
cial openly espouse and carry out a policy of "getting rid of"
people based upon their race and have it approved by the
courts?
The practice of total exclusion from jury service on the
basis of race is not limited to the district attorney in Jackson.
A prosecutor in Chambers County, Alabama, used twenty-six
jury strikes against twenty-six African-Americans who were
qualified for jury duty in order to get three all-white juries in
a case involving Albert Jefferson, a mentally retarded Afri-
can-American, accused of a crime against a white victim.92
At the time of Jefferson's trial, marriage records at the court-
house in Chambers County were kept in books engraved
"white" and "colored."93 During state post-conviction pro-
ceedings, lawyers representing Jefferson discovered lists
which had been made by the prosecutor prior to jury selec-
tion in which the prosecutor divided prospective jurors into
four lists-"strong," "medium," "weak," and "black."94 A state
circuit judge in Chambers County ruled that no racial dis-
crimination had occurred in the selection of the juries.95
Some courts are indifferent to even the most blatant ap-
pearances of racial bias. African-Americans facing the death
penalty in Georgia usually appear before a white judge sit-
ting in front of the Confederate battle flag. Georgia adopted
its state flag in 195696 to symbolize its defiance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.97
As observed one federal district court in Georgia
89. Id.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Death Row USA, supra note 1 at 6.
92. Alabama v. Jefferson, Cir. Ct. Chambers County No. CC-81-77 (Order of
Oct. 2, 1992). One jury was for a hearing on Jefferson's mental competence to
stand trial, another was for guilt and the third was for sentencing. Id.
93. Alabama County Still Records Marriages by Race, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
July 21, 1991, at A2.
94. Alabama v. Jefferson, Order of Oct. 2, 1992, supra note 92.
95. Id. The court held there were race neutral reasons for each of the
strikes of African-Americans.
96. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (Michie 1994)
97. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in the public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Board of Education, 349
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The predominant part of the 1956 flag is the Confederate
battle flag, which is historically associated with the Ku
Klux Klan. The legislators who voted for the 1956 bill
knew that the new flag would be interpreted as a state-
ment of defiance against federal desegregation mandates
and an expression of anti-black feelings.9"
The new flag was designed to carry the message that Georgia
"intend[s] to uphold what [it] stood for, will stand for, and will
fight for"-namely, state-sponsored commitment to black
subordination and the denial of equal protection of the laws
to Georgia's African-American school children.99 Although it
is well recognized that the flag serves as "a visual focal point
for racial tensions"100 and symbolizes defiance of the principle
of equal protection under law, it is displayed in most Georgia
courtrooms.
B. Discrimination in the Exercise of Discretion
Members of racial minorities have long been excluded
from being prosecutors, judges, jurors, lawyers, and from
holding prominent positions in law enforcement. A typical
scene in a Georgia courtroom was described as follows:
Four black men stood before a Cobb County judge recently
asking for bond to be set in their cases, all involving drug
U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (requiring that desegregation of the public schools proceed
"with all deliberate speed").
98. Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1995). See also
Julius Chambers, Protection of Civil Rights: A Constitutional Mandate for the
Federal Government, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 1599, 1601 n.9 (1989).
99. Jim Auchmutey, Unraveling the Flag: A Guide to Rebel Colors, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Sept. 29, 1991, at Ml, M8 (quoting state representative Denmark
Groover). See also Miller Throws in Towel on Flag, COLUMBUS LEDGER-EN-
QUIRER, Mar. 10, 1993, at Al. Governor Marvin Griffin delivered the same
message of defiance during his State of the State address in 1956 stating: "All
attempts to mix the races whether they be in the classrooms, on the play-
grounds, in public conveyances, [or] in any other area of close contact imperil
the mores of the South." Mark Sherman, Pledging Allegiances at Flag Forum,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 29, 1993, at G1, G6.
100. Augustus v. School Board of Escambia County, 507 F.2d 152, 155 (5th
Cir. 1975). As one court observed:
To some, [the flag] represents the undeniable fact that Georgia
was a member of the Confederacy and did secede from the Union. The
flag may also represent southern heritage, the old South, or values of
independence. Undeniably, to others it represents white supremacy,
rebellion, segregation, and discrimination. The court is not prepared
to say that any of these perspectives are incorrect. The only thing that
is clear is what the flag is not: a symbol of unity for Georgians.
Coleman, supra note 98, at 1569.
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charges. After reviewing each case, the judge ordered
them all held without bond until trial. Virtually everyone
else in the courtroom-the judge, two prosecutors, five
defense lawyers, law clerks and bailiff-were white peo-
ple. "If [my son] had been white, he'd be coming home,"
said the mother of one defendant. "You saw what hap-
pened in there. It resembled some kind of Klan meeting."
While the Cobb judge's handling of the case was not unu-
sual, neither was the mother's reaction. 01
Things are no different in many other courtrooms throughout
the nation. The criminal justice system in Jacksonville, Flor-
ida was described as follows:
Often the only black faces involved in Jacksonville
murder cases belong to the victim and the killer.
In a city where most murders are committed by
blacks against other blacks, the faces of law and order are
overwhelmingly white.
There are:
No black felony judges, the only circuit judges to han-
dle homicides.
No black members of the Public Defender Office homi-
cide team.
Two black prosecutors out of 14 homicide-team mem-
bers and supervisors at the State Attorney's Office.
Four black homicide detectives and supervisors out of
26 at the Jacksonville's Sheriff's Office.1" 2
Thus, members of racial minorities often do not partici-
pate in the highly subjective decisions that lead to the impo-
sition of the death penalty. Such decisions are frequently
made by persons who are hostile to, or at the very least indif-
ferent or insensitive to, the minority community.
1. Discretion Exercised by Law Enforcement Officials
and Prosecutors
The most important decisions that may determine
whether the accused is sentenced to die are those made by
the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor who decides whether to
seek the death penalty, and whether to resolve the case with
a plea bargain for a sentence less than death. In many juris-
101. Curriden, supra note 58, at D1, D3.
102. See generally Paul Pinkham & Robin Lowenthal, Getting more Minori-
ties Involved... Fosters Respect for the System, THE FLORIDA TIMES UNION, Dec.
10, 1991, at Al.
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dictions, these critical decisions are made by one white man,
the elected district attorney, with no input from the commu-
nity. Even where more than one person decides, there may
be no representation for the minority community. For exam-
ple, in Orange County, the jurisdiction which ranks third in
sending people to California's death row, a panel of prosecu-
tors composed exclusively of white males decides whether
the death sentence will be sought in a case. 10 3 Some prosecu-
tors seek the death penalty frequently. Some hardly ever
seek it. There are no state-wide standards to govern when
the death penalty is sought. Each local district attorney sets
his or her own policy in deciding which cases will be prose-
cuted as death cases.
In most jurisdictions with the death penalty, all murders
accompanied by another felony, as well as all murders consid-
ered "heinous, atrocious or cruel" or "outrageously and wan-
tonly vile, horrible and inhuman," may be prosecuted as capi-
tal cases. 104 From among the many cases where death could
be sought, the local district attorney decides which few will
actually be prosecuted as capital cases. For the white men
who usually make these decisions in judicial districts all over
the country, the crime may seem more heinous or horrible if
the victim is a prominent white citizen. As one scholar has
observed: "The life-and-death decision is made on trivial
grounds, and tends to reflect the community's prejudices."'0 5
Race may also influence the decision to seek the death
sentence in more subtle ways. Prosecutors make the decision
whether to seek the death penalty based in part on the
strength of the evidence brought to them by law enforcement
in each case. Often, the amount of available evidence differs
because the local sheriffs and police departments investigate
crime in the white community much more aggressively than
crime in the black community. 10 6 While massive searches in-
103. Rene Lynch, Deciding Life or Death for O.C.'s Worst Murderers, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at Al.
104. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
105. Rick Bragg, Two Crimes, Two Punishments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995,
at 1 (quoting Franklin Zimring, Director of the Earl Warren Legal Institute at
the University of California at Berkeley).
106. Studies and cases documenting discriminatory practices by police
against racial minorities are collected and discussed by Charles J. Ogletree,
Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions, CHAMPION, July 1991, at 7, 10-12.
Even before the notorious Rodney King case and the Mark Fuhrman tapes,
there was concern about the racial attitudes of the police department in Los
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volving the police, army units, and even the Boy Scouts may
occur when there is a crime against a white person, 10 7 noth-
ing more than a missing person report may be completed
when a black citizen disappears.' 08 This disparity in the in-
vestigative treatment of cases results in a disparity of evi-
dence available to prosecute the cases. Thus, racial discrimi-
nation against crime victims by police departments results in
the prosecutor having stronger evidence with which to justify
seeking the death penalty in white victim cases and not seek-
ing it in cases where the victim is a minority.
As a result of these influences, many cases in which pros-
ecutors decide to seek the death penalty are indistinguish-
able from hundreds of other murder cases in which the death
penalty is not sought. For example, most tragically, there are
many convenience store robberies that result in a loss of life.
Only a handful are prosecuted as death cases. A case involv-
ing a battered woman with no criminal record who kills her
abusive spouse is typically not a death penalty case in most
parts of the country. However, the prosecutor in Talladega,
Alabama, has obtained death sentences for at least two bat-
tered women for their roles in killing their abusers. 10 9 Of
course, there are many other examples of cases which are eli-
gible for the death penalty, but are seldom prosecuted as cap-
ital cases.
An investigation into why some cases are treated as capi-
tal cases when other similar cases are not will almost always
Angeles. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 116 n.3 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that although only 9 % of the residents of Los Angeles are
black males, they have accounted for 75 % of the deaths resulting from
chokeholds by police).
107. See, e.g., Carl Cannon, Abducted Girl Found Slain Near her Columbus
Home, COLUMBUS GA. LEDGER-ENQUIRER, July 17, 1977, at 1 (describing search
for missing white victim by police officers, "truckloads of Military Policemen,
trained dogs, an Army helicopter, and troops of Boy Scouts").
108. For example, after an African-American youth disappeared in Colum-
bus, Georgia, he was first reported missing. Later his father was told a body
had been found but it could not be identified because it was so badly decom-
posed. Two weeks later, the police told the father the body was definitely that
of his son, who had been stabbed to death. Transcript of hearing held on Sept.
1-14, 1991, Sept. 12, 1991, at 176-177, State v. Brooks, Indictment Nos. 3888,
54606, on appeal, 415 S.E.2d 903 (Super. Ct. of Muscogee Co., Ga. 1992) [here-
inafter Hearing on Racial Discrimination].
109. Exparte Haney, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992); Walker v. State, 586 So. 2d




reveal the influence of race, class, and politics. Often, there
is more publicity and greater outrage in the community over
an interracial crime than other crimes. Community outrage,
the need to avenge the murder because of the prominence of
the victim in the community, the insistence of the victim's
family on the death penalty, the social and political clout of
the family in the community, and the amount of publicity re-
garding the crime are often far more important in determin-
ing whether death is sought than the facts of the crime or the
defendant's record and background.
For example, an investigation of all murder cases prose-
cuted in Georgia's Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit from 1973
to 1990 revealed that in cases involving the murder of a white
person, prosecutors often met with the victim's family and
discussed whether to seek the death penalty.11 ° In a case in-
volving the murder of the daughter of a prominent white con-
tractor, the prosecutor contacted the contractor and asked
him if he wanted to seek the death penalty.1"1 When the con-
tractor replied in the affirmative, the prosecutor said that
was all he needed to know.112 He obtained the death penalty
at trial. 13 He was rewarded with a contribution of $5,000
from the contractor when he successfully ran for judge in the
next election.'1 4 The contribution was the largest received by
the District Attorney.11 5 There were other cases in which the
District Attorney issued press releases announcing that he
was seeking the death penalty after meeting with the family
of a white victim." 6 But prosecutors failed to meet with Afri-
can-Americans whose family members had been murdered to
determine what sentence they wanted. Most were not even
110. Hearing on Racial Discrimination, supra note 108, Transcript of Sept.
12, 1991, at 67-69. The evidence is described in David Margolick, In Land of
Death Penalty, Accusations of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at Al; and
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL DISTRICT: THE BUCKLE
OF THE DEATH BELT 10 (1991).
111. Transcript of Hearing at 38, Davis v. Kemp, Super. Ct. of Butts Co., Ga.,
(1988) (No. 86-V-865) (testimony of James Isham, father of the victim).
112. Id.
113. Davis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986).
114. Clint Claybrook, Slain Girl's Father Top Campaign Contributor, Co-
LUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Aug. 7, 1988, at B1.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Phil Gast, District Attorney Criticizes Court for Rejecting Sen-
tence, COLUMBUS ENQUIRER, Sept. 17, 1983 at Al, A2.
4531995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
notified that the case had been resolved. 117 As a result of
these practices, although African-Americans were the victims
of sixty-five percent of the homicides in the Chattahoochee
Judicial Circuit, eighty-five percent of the capital cases in
that circuit were white victim cases. 118
2. Exclusion of Minority Persons from Juries
The prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty may
never be reviewed by a minority juror. Many capital cases
are tried in white flight suburban communities where there
are so few minority persons in the community that there is
little likelihood the minority community will be represented
on the jury. Counties like Baltimore County, Maryland, and
Cobb County, Georgia, account for a disproportionately high
number of persons sentenced to death in those states. 11 9 But
even in communities where there is a substantial minority
population, prosecutors are often successful in preventing or
minimizing participation by minorities.
During jury selection for a capital trial, the judge or pros-
ecutor asks potential jurors if they are conscientiously op-
posed to the death penalty. If they are opposed to the death
penalty and cannot put their views aside, the state is entitled
to have those people removed for cause. 20 Although this pro-
cess results in a more conviction-prone jury, it has been up-
held by the Supreme Court.1 21 This "death qualification" pro-
cess often results in the removal of more prospective jurors
117. Hearing on Racial Discrimination, supra note 108, Transcript of Sept.
12, 1991 at 178, 184-85, 192-93, 197, 199-200.
118. See Defense Exhibit 1A, admitted at Hearing on Racial Discrimination,
supra note 108.
119. See REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY:
AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN MARYLAND: 1978 To 1993 (Nov. 1993)
at 91, 92, 119 (although Baltimore City has well over ten times as many
murders as Baltimore County each year, of forty-one death sentences imposed
in Maryland under its current death penalty statute, twenty-two were imposed
in Baltimore County; of the fifteen death sentences in effect on June 30, 1993,
all but four were from Baltimore County; only five death sentences were im-
posed in Baltimore City and only two of the sentences in effect on June 30,
1993, were from Baltimore City). The author is aware of seventeen death
sentences imposed in Cobb County, Georgia, under the death penalty statute
adopted by Georgia in 1973. This is among the highest number of death
sentences for a Georgia county.
120. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
121. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986).
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who are members of minority groups than those who are
white. The minority jurors may have reservations about the
death penalty because it has been used in a racially discrimi-
natory manner. This is one of many ways in which past dis-
crimination in the application of the death penalty perpetu-
ates continued discrimination.
Often the "death qualification" process reduces the
number of minority jurors to few enough that those remain-
ing can be eliminated by the prosecutor with peremptory
strikes. Even when jurors who express reservations about
the death penalty indicate they can put aside their personal
views and consider it, the prosecutor may justify his or her
strikes with the hesitancy of those jurors to impose the death
penalty. For example, in Lingo v. State,122 a Georgia prose-
cutor used all eleven of his jury strikes against African-Amer-
icans to obtain an all white jury in a capital case. 123 In a
challenge to those strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 24 the
Georgia Supreme Court-over the dissent of its two African-
American justices-upheld the strikes based on the "race
neutral" reasons articulated by the prosecutor, many of
which had to do with the jurors' answers to the death qualifi-
cation questions.1 2
5
A federal court in Alabama found the "standard operat-
ing procedure of the Tuscaloosa County District Attorney's
Office" was "to use the peremptory challenges to strike as
many blacks as possible from the venires in cases involving
serious crimes."1 26 The District Court also found that
prosecutors,
manipulated the trial docket in their effort to preserve the
racial purity of criminal juries. Inasmuch as they actually
set the criminal trial dockets until 1982, they imple-
mented a scheme in which juries with fewer black
venirepersons would be called for the serious cases.
127
In Georgia's Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, which has
sent more people to death row than any other circuit in the
122. 437 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 1993).
123. Id. at 465.
124. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
125. Lingo, 437 S.E.2d at 466-67.
126. Jackson v. Thigpen, 752 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, sub nom. Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
1995).
127. Id. at 1555.
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state, 12 prosecutors have used eighty-three percent of their
opportunities to use peremptory jury strikes against African-
Americans, even though black people constitute thirty-four
percent of the population in the circuit.'29 As a result, six
African-American defendants were tried by all-white ju-
ries.13 0 Two of them have been executed.1
3 1
William Henry Hance was the first black defendant tried
in a Chattahoochee Circuit capital case after Furman to have
a member of his race on his jury. 132 During jury selection at
Hance's first trial, the prosecutor used nine of his ten per-
emptory strikes against African-Americans, leaving one black
on the jury. 13 3 The death penalty was imposed. However, it
was later set aside because the prosecutor made a lynch-mob
type appeal to the jury for the death penalty in closing argu-
ment, which the United States Court of Appeals character-
ized as a "dramatic appeal to gut emotion" that "has no place
in a courtroom."'3 4 These words from a federal court had no
impact on the prosecutor. After the reversal, he called a
press conference, insisted that he had done nothing wrong,
and announced he would once again seek the death penalty
against Hance.1' 5 At the second trial, he used seven of eight
strikes against blacks, again eliminating all but one member
of Hance's race from jury service. 136 Hance was again sen-
tenced to death and this death sentence was carried out.'
3 7
The judicial circuit second only to Chattahoochee in
sending people to Georgia's death row is the Ocmulgee Judi-
128. By the author's count, the death sentence has been imposed 22 times in
the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, more than any other judicial circuit in
Georgia. Four of those death sentences have been carried out. Three of the four
persons executed were African-Americans.
129. Defense Exhibit 2A, admitted at Hearing on Racial Discrimination,
supra note 108.
130. Id.
131. Joseph Mulligan and Jerome Bowden, both sentenced to death by all-
white juries, have been executed. Death Row USA, supra note 1, at 5.
132. See Defense Exhibit 1A, admitted in Hearing on Racial Discrimination,
supra note 108.
133. Id.
134. Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 952 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1210 (1994).
135. Hearing on Racial Discrimination, supra note 108, Transcript of Sept.
12, 1991, at 144-46 (testimony of William J. Smith, the prosecutor in Hance).
136. Defense Exhibit 2A, admitted in Hearing on Racial Discrimination,
supra note 108.
137. Hance was executed on March 31, 1994. Death Row USA, supra note 1,
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cial Circuit in middle Georgia. 138  Joseph Briley tried thirty-
three death penalty cases in his tenure as District Attorney
in the circuit between 1974 and 1994.131 Of those thirty-
three cases, twenty-four were against African-American de-
fendants. 140  It was discovered that Briley had instructed
jury commissioners in one county in the circuit to under-
represent black citizens on the master jury lists from which
grand and trial juries were selected. 14 1 Additionally, the Af-
rican-Americans who were summoned for jury duty in the cir-
cuit were often sent back home after Briley used his peremp-
tory jury strikes against them. In the cases in which the
defendants were black and the victims were white, Briley
used ninety-four percent of his jury challenges-96 out of
103-against black citizens. 142
When a prosecutor uses the overwhelming majority of his
jury strikes against a racial minority, that minority is prohib-
ited from participating in the process. A jury does not repre-
sent "the conscience of the community on the ultimate ques-
tion of life or death"143 when one-fourth or more of the
community is not represented on it.'
44
African-Americans and other minorities continue to be
excluded from jury service, even after the Supreme Court's
decision in Batson v. Kentucky,' 45 which changed the stan-
dard of proof for establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.146 Batson requires trial judges-most of whom are
138. By the author's count, 18 persons have been sentenced to death in the
Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit since 1973.
139. Charts showing most of the prosecutor's capital trials are included in
Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1468-70 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117
L.Ed.2d 652 (1992). Two other capital cases were tried against white defend-
ants before the prosecutor left office. Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. 1992);
Fugate v. State, 431 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1993).
140. Horton, 941 F.2d at 1468-70.
141. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
142. Horton, 941 F.2d at 1458.
143. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
144. Id.
145. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
146. Id. After years of criticism about the crippling and virtually impossible
burden of proof established in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the
Supreme Court held that a prima facie case of racial discrimination could be
established by disparate strikes against minority jurors in a particular case.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Swain had required the defendant to
prove that the prosecutor struck black citizens "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim
may be... with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Swain,
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popularly elected-to assess the district attorney's reasons in
order to determine whether the prosecutor intended to dis-
criminate. 141 Many judges are former prosecutors who may
have hired the district attorneys appearing before them.
Even if the judge is not personally close to the prosecutor, he
or she may be dependent upon the prosecutor's support in the
election to remain in office. 148 Thus, in the many jurisdic-
tions where judges are elected, it may be politically impossi-
ble and personally difficult for the judge to reject a reason
proffered by the prosecutor for striking a minority juror.
Courts routinely uphold convictions and death sentences
even where a grossly disproportionate number of African-
Americans have been excluded from jury service by the prose-
cutor's peremptory jury strikes. 149
Racial diversity on juries makes a difference in capital
trials. Juries selected through discriminatory practices often
bring to the jury box, either consciously or subconsciously,
"racial stereotypes and assumptions" which influence them
"in the direction of findings of black culpability and white vic-
timization,.., black immorality and white virtue,... blacks
as social problems and whites as valued citizens." 50 Experi-
ence has taught that the death penalty is much more likely
to be imposed in cases tried to all-white juries than in cases
tried to more racially diverse juries.' 51 Decisions made by
all-white juries do not receive the respect of other racial
380 U.S. at 223. Swain is discussed further in notes 225-228 and accompany-
ing text.
147. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
148. See, e.g., Mark Ballard, Gunning For A Judge; Houston's Lanford
Blames DA's Office For His Downfall, TEX. LAw., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1 (describing
how Houston District Attorney John B. Holmes, unhappy with rulings by a Re-
publican judge in two murder cases, helped cause the judge's defeat by running
one of his assistants against the judge and causing congestion in his docket).
149. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Per-
emptory Challenge, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1993); Michael J. Raphael &
Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v.
Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 229 (1993).
150. Peggy C. Davis, Popular Legal Culture: Law as Microaggression, 98
YALE L.J. 1559, 1571 (1989).
151. The psychological tendency of predominantly white decision-makers to
sympathize more with whites than blacks is described in Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 COR-
NELL L. REV. 655, 708 (1989); Francis C. Dane & Laurence S. Wrightsman, Ef-
fects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 104-06 (1982). The effect is particularly
pronounced and results in the most severe sentences where the victim is of the
458 [Vol. 35
DEATH PENALTY SYMPOSIUM
groups which were denied participation. On the other hand,
more diverse juries bring to their decision-making a broader
perspective gained through varied life experiences. An Afri-
can-American member of the Georgia Supreme Court has ob-
served that, "[wlhen it comes to grappling with racial issues
in the criminal justice system today, often white Americans
find one reality while African-Americans see another. " 152
The decisions of representative juries are seen as more legiti-
mate and are accorded greater respect by all segments of the
community.
3. The Impact of Racial Prejudice of Defense Counsel
In rejecting a challenge to the effectiveness of a defense
lawyer who expressed racist sentiments in Dobbs v. Zant,153
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals reasoned
that since the defense lawyer did not decide the sentence, the
claim should be rejected.15 4 But there are numerous other
ways in which the racial prejudice of defense counsel may af-
fect the sentencing decision.
A lawyer defending the accused in a capital case has the
obligation to investigate the life and background of the client
in order to introduce mitigating evidence. 55 To fulfill this
constitutional and ethical obligation, a lawyer must be com-
fortable working with the client, the client's family, and the
client's friends. If the appointed lawyer regards the client,
his family, or his friends in a demeaning way, the lawyer can-
not possibly obtain and present the needed information and
fulfill the role as an advocate for the client's life. In addition,
the defendant who is assigned a lawyer who shares the racial
same race and the defendant is of a different race from that of the jurors. Id. at
106.
152. Lingo v. State, 437 S.E.2d 463, 468 (Ga. 1993) (Sears-Collins, J.,
dissenting).
153. See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
154. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 963 F.2d
1403, 1407 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
155. Any aspect of the life and background of the accused may be considered
by the sentencer as a reason to impose a sentence less than death. See supra
note 72. For a discussion of the special demands upon defense counsel in prop-
erly preparing for the defense of a capital trial see Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 323 (1993). See also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 303-
04 (1983).
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prejudices of the jurors, judge, and prosecutor is left without
an advocate to expose and challenge such biases.
For example, a federal district court in Alabama de-
scribed the representation provided to an African-American
woman whose court-appointed lawyers had assumed she
would not be sentenced to death for the "shothouse killing" of
another black woman:
Petitioner's counsel did not prepare for the sentenc-
ing hearing....
Roughly one hour after her conviction, petitioner and
her counsel appeared before the jury again for the sen-
tencing hearing. [Counsel] testified at the habeas hear-
ing that he told the judge the [capital murder] verdict was
so shocking to him that he was not prepared to go forward
with sentencing.
Between the time of petitioner's indictment and sen-
tencing, her lawyers did no work on the sentencing as-
pects of her case....
No social history of petitioner was undertaken prior
to either of the sentencing hearings [one before the jury
and the second before a judge]. No family members or
friends were contacted and informed of either the sentenc-
ing hearing before the jury or the trial judge. Therefore,
no evidence of mitigation was adduced....
... At the onset of petitioner's trial, when they clearly
should have challenged the prosecutor's intentional and
racially-motivated utilization of peremptory challenge to
exclude all blacks from the jury chosen to try their black
client, petitioner's counsel inexplicably failed to do so.156
One reason for the inadequate representation that Mel-
vin Wade received before being sentenced to death by a Cali-
fornia jury may have been the racial attitudes of his attorney.
The attorney, who used racial slurs to refer to African-Ameri-
cans, including Wade, failed to adequately present evidence
of Wade's abuse as a child. The attorney also gave harmful
closing arguments, including a penalty phase argument
which asked the jury to impose the death sentence on his cli-
ent. Kim Taylor, an associate professor at Stanford Univer-
sity Law School and former director of the Public Defender
for the District of Columbia, described the relationship be-
156. Jackson v. Thigpen, 752 F. Supp. 1551, 1555, 1556, 1562 (N.D. Ala.




tween counsel's racial attitudes and his performance as
follows:
From the evidence before me, it seems clear that race
played a significant and insidious role in Mr. Wade's
trial.... Mr. Wade was represented by a man who viewed
blacks with contempt, and this evidence is supported by
the manner in which that attorney conducted himself at
trial. Trial counsel failed to take any steps to impeach the
state's injection of racial stereotyping and race-based mis-
information into the case... and counsel comported him-
self in his argument to the jury in a manner as to convey
his raced-based contempt.1
5 7
Such performances by defense counsel make it impossi-
ble for jurors to perform their constitutional obligation to im-
pose a sentence based on "a reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime."158 Nor can
courts discharge their responsibility to protect the constitu-
tional rights of the accused, including the right to a trial not
infected by racial discrimination, when court-appointed law-
yers fail to raise issues of discrimination out of ignorance or
indifference.
C. Disparities in Imposition of Death Sentences in the
State Courts
Sentencing patterns confirm that racial prejudice plays a
role in imposition of the death penalty. Although African-
Americans make up only twelve percent of the total popula-
tion of the United States, they have been the victims in about
half of the total homicides in this country in the last twenty-
five years.159 In some states in the South, where capital pun-
ishment is often imposed, African-Americans are the victims
of over sixty percent of the murders. Yet eighty-five percent
of the cases in which the death penalty has been carried out
have involved white victims.
1 6 0
157. Declaration of Kim Antoinette Taylor, Sept. 30, 1991, filed in Wade v.
Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1995).
158. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
159. Erik Eckholm, Studies Find Death Penalty Often Tied to Victim's Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1995, at Al; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 384,
table 3.128 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1993).
160. Death Row USA, supra note 1, at 3.
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In Georgia, for example, although African-Americans
were the victims of 63.5 percent of the murders between 1976
and 1980, 82 percent of the cases in which death was imposed
during that period involved murders of whites.' 6' Professor
David Baldus and his associates conducted two studies of the
influence of race in the application of the death penalty, ex-
amining over 2,000 murder cases which occurred in Georgia
during the 1970s.16 2 They found that prosecutors are more
likely to seek the death penalty where the victim is white and
juries are more likely to impose the death penalty in such
cases.16 3 Defendants charged with murders of white persons
received the death penalty in eleven percent of the cases,
while defendants charged with murders of blacks received
the death penalty in only one percent of the cases. 16 4 Defend-
ants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more
likely to receive a death sentence than defendants charged
with killing blacks.
16
Georgia carried out twenty executions, under the death
penalty statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976, by Au-
gust 31, 1995.166 Twelve of those executed were African-
Americans.' 6 7 In eighteen of the cases, the victims were
white.'6  Six of the African-Americans executed were sen-
tenced to death by all-white juries.169 These patterns are not
limited to Georgia. Nine of the first twelve persons executed
in Alabama were African-American. 170 The General Account-
ing Office summarized its analysis of twenty-eight studies of
the death penalty as follows:
In 82 percent of the studies, race of the victim was
found to influence the likelihood of being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those
161. GROSS & MAuRo, supra note 15, at 43-44.
162. The studies are discussed extensively in BALDUS ET AL., supra note 15;
and in the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-
87 (1987); id. at 325-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 149-57, 160-78, 311-40; McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 287.
164. BALDus ET AL., supra note 15, at 314-15; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
165. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 316; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
166. Death Row USA, supra note 1, at 9.
167. Id. at 4-9.
168. Id.
169. The author has made this determination from the trial judge's reports
to the Georgia Supreme Court in the six cases which indicate that no member of




who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be
sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks. This
finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic
techniques. 171
The United States Supreme Court permitted such racial
disparities in the imposition of the death penalty in McCles-
key v. Kemp.172 By a 5-4 vote, the Court allowed Georgia to
carry out its death penalty law despite racial disparities that
would not be officially tolerated in any other area of the law.
The Court rejected challenges based on equal protection and
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual clause. 173 The
Court found that the studies established "at most.., a dis-
crepancy that appears to correlate with race" 174 and declined
"to assume that that which is unexplained is invidious,"' 75
thus holding the disparities insufficient even to raise a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. The Court also expressed
its concern that "McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical con-
clusion, throws into serious question the principles that un-
derlie our entire criminal justice system."176 Justice Bren-
nan, in dissent, characterized this concern as "a fear of too
much justice."'77
The Court's fear of too much justice may result in no jus-
tice at all. The decision in McCleskey has been employed by
lower federal and state courts to avoid dealing with issues of
racial discrimination. Its crippling standard of proof, dis-
cussed more fully in section IV.C., is so formidable that many
courts have denied even a hearing on gross racial dispari-
ties.' 78 As will be discussed there, such an unwillingness to
confront racial issues allows discrimination to go unchecked.
171. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RE-
SEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (Feb. 1990).
172. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
173. Id. at 306.
174. Id. at 312.
175. Id. at 313.
176. Id. at 314-15.
177. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. See infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
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D. Disparities in Federal Death Prosecutions
The federal government in pursuing death sentences au-
thorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988179 has an even
worse record of discrimination than the states. The Act au-
thorizes the death penalty for murders committed by "king-
pins" involved in drug trafficking "enterprises."180 Federal
prosecutors are given wide discretion in deciding whether to
seek the death penalty. One Congressional committee ob-
served: "The drug trafficking 'enterprise' can consist of as few
as five individuals, and even a low-ranking 'foot soldier' in the
organization can be charged with the death penalty if in-
volved in a killing."181
Although three-fourths of those convicted of participat-
ing in a drug enterprise under the general provisions of 21
U.S.C. section 848 are white,18 2 the death penalty provisions
of the Act have been used almost exclusively against minori-
ties. Of the first thirty-seven federal death penalty prosecu-
tions, all but four were against members of minority
groups.18 3  Nevertheless, in 1994, Congress provided the
death penalty for over fifty additional crimes and refused to
enact the Racial Justice Act.1 8 4
Those accused of federal capital crimes are supposedly
protected from racial discrimination by the requirements that
juries be instructed not to discriminate and all jurors sign
certificates guaranteeing they did not discriminate.1 8 ' But
this almost laughable provision is hardly a protection against
racial discrimination. By the time the jury is selected, racial
prejudice may have already influenced the prosecutor's deci-
sions to seek the death penalty, to refuse a plea bargain for a
non-capital sentence, and to strike minority jurors. More-
over, the most pernicious racial discrimination that occurs to-
day is that perpetrated by those who have the sophistication
179. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
180. House Subcommittee, Racial Disparities in Federal Death Penalty Pros-
ecutions, supra note 14, at 2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3.
184. See The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). There is no reason to expect that the
federal government will be more successful in preventing discrimination under
the Violent Crime Control Act than it has been with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) (1988).
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not to admit their biases. Those who live in racially exclusive
neighborhoods, are members of racially exclusive social orga-
nizations, send their children to segregation academies, and
refuse to rent to black citizens may be more than happy to
listen to jury instructions and sign the certificate of nondis-
crimination before sending some black person off to his death.
Of course, many may not even be aware of their unconscious
racism.
E. Failure to Pass the Racial Justice Act
Despite the pronounced racial disparities in the infliction
of the death penalty in both state and federal capital cases,
Congress refused to include the Racial Justice Act as part of
the crime bill in 1994, just as it refused to enact the Racial
Justice Act in previous years.186 The Racial Justice Act was a
modest proposal that would have required courts to hold
hearings on racial disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty and look behind the disparities to determine whether
they were related to race or some other factor.' 87
It is not unreasonable to require publicly elected prosecu-
tors to justify racial disparities in capital prosecutions. If
there is an underrepresentation of black citizens in a jury
pool, jury commissioners are required to explain the dispar-
ity.' 8 8 A prosecutor who strikes a disproportionate number of
black citizens in selecting a jury is required to rebut the in-
ference of discrimination by showing race neutral reasons for
his or her strikes.8 9 If there are valid, race neutral explana-
tions for the disparities in capital prosecutions, they should
be presented to the courts and the public. Prosecutors, like
other public officials, should be accountable for their actions.
The bases for critical decisions about whether to seek the
death penalty and whether to agree to a sentence less than
186. The Racial Justice Act was adopted in a version of the crime bill that
passed the House of Representatives in April, 1994. See David Cole, Fear of Too
Much Justice, LEGAL TIMES, May 9, 1994, at 26. However, due to opposition in
the Senate, it was not included in the final bill reported by the conference com-
mittee and adopted by both the Senate and the House later in the summer.
187. See David Cole, Fear of Too Much Justice, supra note 186.
188. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Gibson v. Zant, 705
F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983). Once it is shown that there is substantial under-
representation, jury officials must demonstrate that it was not the result of
discrimination.
189. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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death in exchange for a guilty plea should not be shrouded in
secrecy, but should be openly set out, defended, and
evaluated.
The likelihood is not that it would be too difficult for
prosecutors to rebut the inference of discrimination, but that
it would be too easy. The task of rebutting an inference of
racial discrimination under Batson has proven to be remark-
ably easy for prosecutors, even when they have used all of
their jury strikes against minorities.190 Nevertheless, the
Racial Justice Act presented the threat of too much justice to
the United States Senate and was defeated.
It is not surprising that Congress failed to pass the Ra-
cial Justice Act. Congress steadfastly refused to pass an anti-
lynching law when African-Americans and other minorities
were being lynched.191 Instead, the federal government put
much of its law enforcement efforts into pursuing moonshin-
ers. Today, the federal government commits ample resources
for questionable and expensive efforts to demonstrate it is
"tough on crime"-the war on drugs, the pursuit of federal
death sentences for many crimes that could be prosecuted in
the state courts, and the housing of ever increasing numbers
of people in federal prisons for longer periods of time. But
few resources are devoted to the constitutional commitment
of equality for racial minorities and the poor.
The United States Department of Justice, which might
be expected to be concerned about racial discrimination in the
courts and its impact on public confidence in the courts, is
now one of the worst offenders in the discriminatory use of
the death penalty. There is no large or powerful constituency
concerned about racial discrimination in capital cases. The
Republican Contract With America for the 1994 elections
promised greater use of the death penalty and even greater
utilization of prisons, not passage of the Racial Justice Act.
Thus, there is no reason to expect solutions or even leader-
ship from the executive or legislative branches of the federal
government with regard to the racial discrimination in capi-
tal cases.
190. See supra note 149.
191. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHINGS IN THE NEW SOUTH; GEORGIA
AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); see generally GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIO-
LENCE IN KENTUCKY (1990).
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IV. THE AVOIDANCE, DENIAL, AND TOLERANCE OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION BY THE COURTS
Despite extraordinary competition among politicians to
be tough on crime, prosecutors and the judicial system re-
main remarkably soft on the crime of racial discrimination.
Those who discriminate are seldom disciplined or punished.
Appellate courts which normally publish long opinions on mi-
nor issues often do not even mention the extraordinary racial
discrimination that comes before them, finding ways to dis-
pose of cases on other grounds. And when racial discrimina-
tion is recognized, the remedies are often woefully
inadequate.
A. The Crime that Goes Unpunished
Jury officials in Alabama, in an attempt to defeat a chal-
lenge to the exclusion of black citizens from jury service in
1933, forged the names of six black citizens on the jury
rolls. 192 The local trial judge rejected the assertion of fraud,
saying he "would not be authorized to presume that some-
body had committed a crime" or had been "unfaithful to their
duties and allowed the books to be tampered with."193 The
United States Supreme Court generously observed that "the
evidence did not justify that conclusion."' 94 Although the
case was reversed, no action was taken against those respon-
sible for the forgery.
1 95
In 1988, the Supreme Court found that a Georgia prose-
cutor instructed jury commissioners to underrepresent Afri-
can-Americans in jury pools in such a way as to avoid detec-
tion and defeat a prima facie case of discrimination. 196 No
action was taken against the prosecutor, and he remained in
office until 1994, when he resigned while under investigation
for sexual harassment.'
97
192. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 592 (1935). Expert testimony estab-
lished that the names of the six black citizens were added by the clerk at the
direction of a jury commissioner. Id.
193. Id. at 593.
194. Id.
195. Norris was again sentenced to death. Dan T. Carter, supra note 35, at
370.
196. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
197. The Briley File, FULTON CoUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 7, 1994, at 1. The
district attorney was not prosecuted for either racial discrimination or sexual
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In Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia, black citizens
were excluded for years and then underrepresented in the
jury pools. In 1966, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that this discrimination violated the Constitution. 198 In
1972, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in an-
other case from the county, and three justices even went so
far as to point out that the way in which juries were being
selected in the county violated 18 U.S.C. section 243, which
makes it a criminal offense to exclude persons from jury ser-
vice on the basis of race. 199
Despite these court decisions, the unconstitutional, sys-
tematic underrepresentation continued throughout the
1970s. This underrepresentation was made possible in part
because one public defender, appointed by white judges in Co-
lumbus, would not, as a matter of "policy," file challenges to
the underrepresentation of blacks in the jury pool for fear of
incurring hostility from the community.2 °°
As a result, at the capital trial of a black man in Colum-
bus, Georgia in 1977-eleven years after the Fifth Circuit de-
cision and five years after the Supreme Court warned that
the exclusion of black citizens violated federal criminal stat-
utes-there were only eight black citizens in a venire of 160
persons.201 A venire that fairly represented the community
would have included fifty black citizens. That case was tried
by an all-white jury.202 The death penalty was imposed.20 3
There are people awaiting execution on Georgia's death
row who were sentenced to death in Columbus by juries cho-
sen in defiance of the Supreme Court's decision requiring an
harassment and was allowed to retire with a pension after 20 years in office.
Id.
198. Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966).
199. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505-07 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
200. Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir.), rehearing denied, 880
F.2d 293, 293-97 (Clark, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 945 (1989).
201. Challenge to the Petit Jury Array filed in State v. Brooks, Indictment
No. 3888 (Nov. 1977), on appeal, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), vacated and remanded,
446 U.S. 961 (1980), on remand, 271 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 921 (1981), conviction and death sentence vacated sub nom. Brooks v.
Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 478
U.S. 1016 (1986), decision adhered to on remand, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1987)
(en banc), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
202. Trial Judge's Report to the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Brooks,




end to discrimination. Yet those who defied the federal
courts and the Constitution were never prosecuted or disci-
plined. Some are still presiding as judges in the local courts
there.
It simply cannot be said that courts are engaging in "un-
ceasing efforts" to eliminate racial discrimination from the
criminal justice system20 4 when prosecutors can rig juries on
the basis of race with impunity, when decisions from the
Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals re-
garding discrimination in jury selection can be ignored for
years with impunity, and a prosecutor may remain in office
and death sentences are carried out even though juries are
selected pursuant to the prosecutor's practice of striking as
many African-Americans as possible. Judicial tolerance of
such discrimination sends the unmistakable message that
the "war on crime" need not be fought according to the Con-
stitution, and racial discrimination will be tolerated when it
is perceived as necessary to obtain convictions and death
sentences.
B. Avoiding Issues Involving Race
Despite the racial discrimination which has been a major
aspect of the death penalty throughout American history, the
Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts have been
reluctant to face racial issues presented by capital cases. The
courts have simply been in a state of denial instead of con-
fronting and dealing with the difficult and sensitive issue of
race.
After declaring racially discriminatory jury selection
practices in one Georgia county unconstitutional,2 °5 the
United States Supreme Court remanded to the Georgia
Supreme Court a capital case in which the jury had been se-
lected by the same illegal means in the same county.20 6 How-
ever, when the Georgia Supreme Court refused to reconsider
its previous holding that the issue had been waived,20 7 the
United States Supreme Court backed down, denied certiorari
204. See supra note 27.
205. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
206. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955).
207. Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
950 (1956).
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and allowed the execution to be carried out.2 °8 It appears
that the Court, already encountering resistance to its deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education,2°9 was anxious to avoid
a confrontation with southern state courts over racial dis-
crimination in the criminal courts.
210
Over ten years later, the United States Supreme Court
appeared willing to review the role of racial prejudice in capi-
tal cases when it granted certiorari in Maxwell v. Bishop,211 a
case in which the Eighth Circuit rejected a challenge based
upon the pronounced disparity in the number of African-
Americans sentenced to death for rape in Arkansas and other
parts of the South.212 However, after twice hearing oral ar-
gument devoted mostly to the issue of racial discrimination,
the Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case
based upon a jury qualification issue which had not even been
raised in the Court of Appeals.213
Although the specter of race discrimination was acknowl-
edged by justices in both the majority and the dissent in
Furman v. Georgia,214 only Justice Marshall discussed racial
discrimination at length.215 Justice Stewart found it unnec-
essary to decide the issue, while acknowledging that "if any
basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sen-
tenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissibly basis of
race."
216
Despite the extraordinary history of discrimination with
regard to the infliction of the death penalty upon African-
208. Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
209. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
See supra note 97.
210. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Au-
thority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1425-26 (1994).
211. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
398 U.S. 262 (1970).
212. Id. at 147.
213. 398 U.S. 262, 262 (1970). MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL:
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 163-67, 199-211 (1973).
214. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing the statutes before the Court as "pregnant with discrimination"); id.
at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
389 n.12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 449-50 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 364-65 (Stewart, J., concurring.).
216. Id. at 310. Justice Douglas concluded there was an unacceptable risk of
discrimination. Id. at 257.
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Americans for the rape of white women,217 the Court did not
even mention race in striking down the death penalty for the
crime of rape in Coker v. Georgia.2
18
It is impossible to know how many state courts have
found ways to avoid the issue of race in deciding capital cases.
The Georgia Supreme Court frequently discusses every issue
presented to it, even those which need not be addressed for a
decision.219 But in holding that a trial judge should be re-
cused from a case because of his involvement in opposing a
motion to disqualify him, the court never mentioned the mo-
tion was based on the judge's long history of racial discrimi-
nation.22° Evidence presented in the trial court established
that the judge regularly appointed jury commissions which
underrepresented African-Americans, tolerated gross under-
representation of blacks in the grand and trial juries, mis-
treated black attorneys in court, used racial slurs, and prac-
ticed discrimination in his personal life.2 2 1  The Missouri
Supreme Court summarily reversed two capital cases with-
out mentioning evidence that prosecutors in Kansas City
used racial slurs to refer to black citizens, systematically ex-
cluded black citizens from juries, and refused to plea bargain
with African-Americans charged with murders of whites
while offering plea bargains in all other potential capital
cases, including a case of murderers who killed four genera-
tions of African-Americans.222
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals similarly failed
to acknowledge or discuss disturbing evidence of racial dis-
crimination in setting aside a capital conviction and sen-
tence.223 The court did not mention that the prosecutor had
used twenty-six peremptory jury strikes against African-
217. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Furman, of the 455 persons executed
for the crime of rape after the Justice Department began compiling statistics,
405 were African-Americans. Id. at 364.
218. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
219. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 449 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 1994).
220. Isaacs v. State, 355 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 1987), ert denied, 497 U.S. 1032
(1990).
221. See id. (transcript of hearing on motion to recuse held Oct. 6-8, 1986).
222. See State v. Taylor, Mo. S. Ct. No. 74220 (Order of June 19, 1993); State
v. Nunley, Mo. S. Ct. No. 76104 (Order of June 29, 1993) (both orders vacate the
judgments in the two cases and remand for a new penalty hearing without opin-
ion or further elaboration). The evidence of racial discrimination was presented
in an evidentiary hearing before the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri,
in 1992.
223. Jefferson v. State, 645 So. 2d 313 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
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Americans after dividing potential jurors into four lists under
the headings, "strong," "medium," "weak" and "black" or that
the trial court had held there was no discrimination.224
Apparently, many courts believe it is best to avoid the
sensitive issue of race. Why else did the courts not denounce
these outrageous examples of racial discrimination in the
strongest terms? While the failure of the appellate courts to
mention the race issues in these cases may have been coinci-
dence, it is more likely that courts are defensive about the
racial discrimination that takes place in what is supposed to
be a system of equal justice. Their opinions leave those who
read them without any hint that the cases involved racial dis-
crimination and thus provide trial courts with no guidance in
considering those issues. In addition, lawyers reading appel-
late opinions are less likely to realize the importance of race
and search out and challenge discrimination. The failure of
the courts to discuss and condemn racial discrimination only
fosters more discrimination.
C. Unreasonable Burdens of Proof, Impossible Standards,
and Inadequate Remedies
In 1965, in the midst of the Warren Court decisions ap-
plying the Bill of Rights to state criminal procedure, the
Court upheld a capital conviction in Swain v. Alabama,225 de-
spite evidence that due to peremptory challenges, no black
person had ever served on a jury in either a criminal or civil
case in Talladega County, Alabama, where African-Ameri-
cans constituted twenty-six percent of the population. While
reiterating its prior pronouncements that "a State's pur-
poseful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of
participation as jurors in the administration of justice vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause,"226 the Court set an almost
impossible burden of proof, holding that to establish discrimi-
nation by a prosecutor in the use of peremptory strikes, a de-
fendant must prove the prosecutor engaged in a practice of
striking black citizens "in case after case, whatever the cir-
cumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant
or the victim may be... with the result that no Negroes ever
224. Id.
225. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
226. Id. at 203-04.
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serve on petit juries." 2 2 7 The decision, disapproving of racial
discrimination but allowing it to continue by setting a virtu-
ally impossible standard of proof, was subject to "almost uni-
versal and often scathing criticism," 228 but remained the law
for twenty years before the standard was changed in Batson
v. Kentucky.229
The Supreme Court has created an equally difficult bar-
rier to sustaining claims of racial discrimination in the inflic-
tion of the death penalty. In McCleskey v. Kemp,23 ° the Court
accepted the racial disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty as "an inevitable part of our criminal justice sys-
tem."23 ' The Court held that to prevail under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause the defendant must present "exceptionally
clear proof"2 3 2 that "the decision makers in his case acted
with discriminatory purpose. "2  As in Swain, the Court
found the evidence insufficient to overcome a presumption of
propriety with regard to the exercise of discretion by prosecu-
tors.2 3 4 But while requiring exceptionally clear proof of dis-
crimination, the Court made it almost impossible to obtain it,
concluding that "the policy considerations behind a prosecu-
tor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the impropriety of
our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek
death penalties, 'often years after they are made.' "215
In rejecting McCleskey's claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court, while acknowledging the risk of racial preju-
dice influencing the capital sentencing decision,2 8 held that
evidence that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death
at nearly twenty-two times the rate of blacks who kill
blacks2 37 did not "demonstrate a constitutionally significant
risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process."238 Thus, the Court held the risk of racial discrimi-
227. Id. at 223.
228. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961,964 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
229. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
230. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
231. Id. at 312.
232. Id. See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text.
233. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
234. Id. at 296.
235. Id.
236. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987).
237. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 313.
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nation was not "constitutionally unacceptable" under the
Eighth Amendment.23 9
This disgraceful decision is more consistent with the
Court's decisions in Swain, Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 4° and
Plessy v. Ferguson241 than its more recent decisions recogniz-
ing racial discrimination in other areas of life. The Court
could have concluded that racial disparities were "inevitable"
or not "constitutionally unacceptable" in education, housing,
employment, or so many other areas of life where minorities
have experienced racial discrimination. Justice Powell, who
cast the deciding vote and authored the majority's opinion in
the 5-4 decision in McCleskey, expressed his regret, after
leaving the Court, at his vote in the case.242
Other courts have followed the Supreme Court's head-in-
the-sand approach. The Florida Supreme Court, by a 4-3
vote, refused to require a hearing on racial disparities in the
infliction of the death penalty.243 The Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the denial of a hearing on racial discrimination
in a capital prosecution against an African-American accused
of the murder of a white person in Cobb County, a county
which has a long history of racial discrimination.24 4 Some
criminal defense lawyers in Cobb County have stated that
they have never had the opportunity to accept or strike an
African-American juror due to the regular practice of the dis-
trict attorney's office of striking all the African-Americans.24 5
To deny even a hearing on racial discrimination in Cobb
239. Id. at 309.
240. 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (holding that African-Americans were "alto-
gether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political rela-
tions; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect").
241. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (holding that "[ilf one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane").
242. John C. Jeffries, Jr., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIoGRAPHY 451
(1994).
243. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 398
(1993).
244. Jones v. State, 440 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1994).
245. Affidavit of Darrell Green, introduced at hearing, Hill v. Zant, Super.
Ct. of Butts Co., Ga., No. CV 85-105(RC), Tr. of Hearing of Dec. 9, 1990 at 39-
42, 51-52, of Dec. 9, on appeal, 425 S.E.2d 858 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 342 (1993). The extraordinary efforts of officials of Cobb County to keep
African-Americans out of their community by refusing to join the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority and other means is described in the affidavit of
Brian Sherman, Ph.D., filed in Hill v. Zant.
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County is simply to run from the truth instead of confronting
it. 246
The willingness of courts to tolerate racial discrimination
in order to carry out the death penalty has a corrupting effect
not just on capital cases, but throughout the criminal justice
system. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court, under im-
mense political pressure from Georgia's Attorney General
and district attorneys and dire warnings that the death pen-
alty was in danger, did a complete about face in only thirteen
days in a case regarding gross racial disparities in sentencing
for drug offenses.2 47 The Court first held by a 4-3 vote that a
prima facie case of racial discrimination was established by
evidence that 98.4% of those serving life sentences for certain
narcotics offenses were black.248 All of the discretion in pur-
suing life sentences for the offenses was entrusted to district
attorneys.2 49 Statistics from the Georgia Department of Cor-
rections established that less than one percent of the whites
eligible for life sentence for narcotics offenses-just one in
168-received it, while 16.6 percent of African-Americans-
202 of 1,219-received it.
25 0
The Attorney General of Georgia joined by all of the
forty-six district attorneys in the state-all of whom are
white-filed a petition for rehearing with the court arguing
that the court's decision took a "substantial step toward in-
validating" the state's death penalty law and would "paralyze
the criminal justice system."25 1 In response, one member of
the court switched his vote and the court adopted the position
of what had previously been the dissent, that the proper gov-
erning standard was McCleskey v. Kemp and, therefore, no
prima facie case had been established.25 2 The only way a
more compelling showing could have been made would have
246. See also Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397 (l1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1051 (1990) (upholding denial of a hearing on racial discrimination).
247. Stephens v. State, No $94A1854, 1995 WL 116292 (Ga. S. Ct. Mar. 17,





251. Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995); Emily Heller, Second
Thoughts on Second-Offense Law, FULTON CouNTY DAILY REPORT, Apr. 3, 1995,
at 1, 10.
252. Emily Heller, Racial Test Put to the Test, FULTON COUNTY DAILY RE-
PORT, Mar. 30, 1995, at 1, 5.
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been if all 100% of those serving life sentences for a second
narcotics offense were black, instead of just 98.4%. Yet the
Georgia Supreme Court chose to erect an impossible standard
of proof based on its interpretation of McCleskey in order to
avoid even a hearing on the reasons for the remarkable racial
disparities in sentencing for narcotics offenses.
The United States Supreme Court based its decision in
McCleskey in part on the "safeguards designed to minimize
racial bias in the process."253 Those safeguards include the
right to a representative jury, the prohibition of use of per-
emptory challenges by prosecutors on the basis of race, and
the right in cases involving interracial crimes to question po-
tential jurors about racial bias.25 4 But in many cases, such
safeguards are either nonexistent or inadequate.
The stages of the process that allow the greatest room for
racial prejudice are the prosecutorial decision to seek the
death penalty and the plea bargaining process. There are no
effective safeguards to prevent discrimination at either of
those stages. As previously noted, many courts which rely on
McCleskey do not even allow hearings on the influence of race
at those critical stages. Minorities remain woefully under-
represented in decision making positions in the criminal jus-
tice system. Courts have been increasingly hostile to chal-
lenges to the exclusion of minorities from state judicial
systems, even when it is apparent that the minority vote has
been diluted in order to preserve a primarily white
judiciary.255
The "safeguards" relied upon by the Court in McCleskey
are also inadequate because issues of discrimination usually
focus on the intent of the decision maker, which is exception-
ally difficult to prove, instead of the results of their actions.
Nor do courts consider unconscious or subtle racial biases of
decision makers. As previously discussed, courts allow prose-
cutors to use even 100 percent of their peremptory jury
strikes based on assertions of "race neutral" reasons.256 The
Supreme Court in McCleskey found that racial disparities did
253. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309, 313 (1987).
254. Id. at 309 n.30.
255. See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed (Mar. 2, 1995); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Cle-
ments, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878
(1994).
256. See supra notes 92-95,122-129, and 149 and accompanying text.
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not sufficiently prove racial discrimination, but it failed to
examine the role that racial stereotypes and other attitudes
may have played in the results.
25 7
Although the Supreme Court in Turner v. Murray258 ac-
knowledged the potential impact that the unconscious racism
of jurors might have on the capital sentencing decision,259
Turner is limited to interracial crimes.2 10 Thus, an accused
who is charged with the murder of a member of his own race
is not entitled to ask prospective jurors about their racial atti-
tudes. Even in interracial crimes, trial courts may limit voir
dire so that it does not disclose subtle racial attitudes which
may come into play.261
The failure of courts to provide poor defendants with ade-
quate legal representation may leave the accused without
any ability to utilize what limited protections are available.
Those accused of crimes in Jefferson County, Georgia, were
tried for years before patently unconstitutional juries because
local lawyers appointed by local judges failed to challenge the
severe underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury
pools. It was shown in one capital case in which the accused
was represented by pro bono lawyers from outside the judicial
circuit that although African-Americans made up 54.5% of
the population of the county, they made up only 21.6% of the
jury pool, an underrepresentation of over 50%.262 However,
when this evidence was presented in a post-conviction chal-
lenge to the conviction and sentence, the federal courts held
that the defendant was barred from raising the issue because
no challenge had been made by the local court appointed law-
yer prior to trial.263 The defendant had the misfortune of be-
ing represented-over his protests-by a court-appointed
lawyer who, when later asked to name the criminal law deci-
257. For a discussion of the relationship of unconscious racism to the deci-
sions in McCleskey v. Kemp, Turner v. Murray and Batson v. Kentucky, see
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
258. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
259. Id. at 35.
260. Id. at 36.
261. The Supreme Court's decision in Turner gives trial judges discretion to
limit the form and number of questions and even allows collective questioning
of the jurors. Turner, 476 U.S. at 37.
262. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 598 n.25 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984).
263. Id. at 600-01.
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sions from any court with which he was familiar, could name
only two: Miranda and Dred Scott.26 4
In Columbus, Georgia, even after the United States
Supreme Court declared that jury officials were unconstitu-
tionally and illegally excluding African-Americans from jury
service, the practice continued because of the "policy" of the
local court-appointed indigent defender of not challenging ra-
cial discrimination for fear of incurring hostility from the
community.265 These are not isolated examples regarding a
single case. The failure of lawyers to challenge clearly uncon-
stitutional racial discrimination in the composition of jury
pools affected every criminal case in these judicial circuits
over decades.
In the case of an African-American tried before an all-
white jury after the prosecutor struck four black jurors, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused
to review a prosecutor's emphasis on the difference in race
between the "attractive" white victim and "this black man"26 6
because no objection had been made at the time of the
argument.26
7
The right to question jurors about race in an interracial
crime was utilized as follows by defense counsel in an Ala-
bama case tried in 1993:
Mr. NELSON [Defense counsel]: I have just a couple
of more questions and I promise I will quit. We are talk-
ing about this case and not some fictional case. In this
case this is a black man and Mrs. Hargrove's son was a
young white man. I will ask you this and it's not-it's like
Bob said. I'm not asking you this to embarrass you, but
do any of you belong to any organizations such as the
Klan or have close family members that belong to the
264. Transcript of Hearing of Apr. 25-27, 1988, at 231, State v. Birt (Super.
Ct. Jefferson Co., Ga. No. 2360, 1988). The lawyer was referring to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Dred Scott was not a criminal case.
265. See notes 198-203 and accompanying text. See also Barrow v. State,
236 S.E.2d 257, 259 (Ga. 1977) (defense attorney did not challenge under-
representation of blacks on the jury because "he felt adverse community pres-
sure would insure to him personally" if he did so); Goodwin v. Balkom, 684 F.2d
794, 806 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing how lawyer's concerns over "community
ostracism" not only inhibited his performance at trial, but "every facet of coun-
sel's functions").
266. Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333, 1351-1352 (8th Cir. 1990)
(Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 1325 n.15.
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Klan or an organization known as the Skinheads, Na[ Izi
groups or anything like that who believe that a race is in-
ferior or a religion is inferior? Do any of you belong to any
of those things?(No response)
MR. NELSON: Do any of you believe any of that
stuff? Is there anybody that believes in that stuff on this
jury?
JUROR BARTLETT: The Klan has a lot of stuff that
they stand for that is good.
MR. NELSON: I'm sorry, Mr. Bartlett?
JUROR BARTLETT: The Klan has lot of things they
stand for that is good. I have read some of their
literature.
MR. NELSON: You believe in some of the doctrine
that the Klan has in their literature?
JUROR BARTLETT: I guess it would be called doc-
trine. I don't know.
MR. NELSON: Would you tell me what it is that you
believe in that you have read?
JUROR BARTLETT: Well, there are just certain
things about the way things are going, the way the law is
going about a lot of this stuff.
MR. NELSON: Let me ask you this. The fact that
this is a black man over here, do you think you could be
fair to him even if-
JUROR BARTLETT: Yeah.
MR. NELSON: Even if the man that was killed was a
young white man?
JUROR BARTLETT: I would be as fair to him as any-
body else.268
No further questions were asked of juror Bartlett or any
other member of the panel regarding the issue of race.269
Such a voir dire is hardly adequate to reveal the "mlore sub-
tle, less consciously held racial attitudes" that the Supreme
Court described in Turner v. Murray.
270
Despite the limitations of Batson v. Kentucky and Turner
v. Murray in preventing racial discrimination, the Court in
McCleskey indulged in the remarkable presumption that the
mere existence of these limited procedural safeguards in jury
selection were sufficient to prevent racial discrimination in
268. Record at 593-94, State v. Pace, Cir. Court of Morgan County, Decatur,
Alabama, No. CC-92-609 (Nov. 9, 1993).
269. Id.
270. 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1976).
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every capital case. At the same time, the Court discounted
evidence which established that in reality the race of the vic-
tim and the race of the defendant actually influenced the sen-
tence in McCleskey's case and other cases despite the
safeguards.
The Supreme Court decision in McCleskey v. Kemp is a
badge of shame upon American's system of justice. It is a
manifestation of indifference on the part of the Court to se-
cure justice for racial minorities in cases in which there is a
long history of discrimination and there is every indication
that racial prejudice influences the vast discretion exercised
in making the highly charged, emotional decisions about who
is to die. The McCleskey decision is worthy of the universal
and scathing criticism visited upon Swain v. Alabama.
V. CONCLUSION
There is enormous public support for the death penalty
in the United States, but little honest discussion of the ineq-
uities involved in its imposition. Many public officials con-
tinue to peddle the preposterous notion that we may ignore
over two centuries of history in race relations as easily as we
may ignore yesterday's weather. They readily admit racial
discrimination up until 1964, or 1972, or even until yester-
day, but argue that it suddenly, magically just ended. Unfor-
tunately, this does not square with the reality of race rela-
tions in the United States today. As Justice William
Brennan observed in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp:
[I]t has been scarcely a generation since this Court's
first decision striking down racial segregation, and barely
two decades since the legislative prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in major domains of national life. These have
been honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that in three
decades we have completely escaped the grip of a histori-
cal legacy spanning centuries.... [W]e remain imprisoned
by the past as long as we deny its influence on the
present.
271
The courts and legislatures have made a tragic mistake
by substituting a notion of what the criminal justice should
be for what it is. Citizens, judges, the bar, and the press
would like to believe we have a system which equally and
271. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting.).
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fairly dispenses justice. But neither legal presumptions nor
legal fictions will make it so. As Justice Thurgood Marshall
said in another context, "constitutionalizing [the] wishful
thinking" that "racial discrimination is largely a phenomenon
of the past" does a "grave disservice ... to those victims of
past and present racial discrimination."272
The criminal justice systems in many parts of the coun-
try have suffered from years of neglect, inadequate funding
and other problems. Often they have been entrusted to per-
sons with neither the ability nor the inclination to carry out
their high functions. Members of racial minorities continue
to be underrepresented in all positions in the criminal justice
system. It should not surprise anyone that the problems of
racial exclusion and racial discrimination are greater there
than in other parts of our society.
The price paid for the denial of racial discrimination by
courts, legislatures, and the bar is considerable. Courts can-
not deliver justice when they tolerate racial prejudice and ra-
cial exclusion. Courts lose respect and credibility when they
refuse to acknowledge and remedy racial discrimination
which is apparent to everyone else. Responding to the public
clamor for executions is not justification for ignoring racial
discrimination in the court system. Courts of vengeance are
not courts of justice.
There is debate over whether racial discrimination in the
infliction of the death penalty can be detected and remedied.
Some think racial discrimination is inevitable and impossible
to prevent; others think the influence of race can be elimi-
nated.27 3 This question must be answered, not avoided. If
racial discrimination cannot be prevented, the death penalty
should not be carried out.274 If discrimination can be elimi-
272. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co, 488 U.S. 469, 552-53 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
273. See David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention,
Detection and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1994); McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that the death penalty
could be constitutionally imposed if limited to the upper range of cases where
prosecutors consistently seek death and juries consistently impose it).
274. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (expressing the view that the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional because of the racial disparities in its infliction); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If society were indeed forced
to choose between a racially discriminatory death penalty ... and no death
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nated, then it should be the highest priority of the courts.
But to pretend it does not exist, to deny a remedy, to deny
even a hearing, is to give up on achieving the goal of equal
justice under law. Tragically, that is what the state and fed-
eral courts have done.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court asserted that
evidence of racial discrimination should be taken to the legis-
latures.275 But legislators respond to powerful interests. The
poor person accused of a crime has no political action commit-
tee, no lobby, and often no effective advocate even in the court
where his life is at stake. The crime debate in the United
States has become increasingly demagogic and irresponsible.
There is little reason for hope in the legislatures.
The constitutional buck of equal protection under law
stops with the Supreme Court and with judges on lower
courts throughout the land who have taken oaths to uphold
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights even against the pas-
sions of the moment and the prejudices that have endured for
centuries. So long as racial discrimination remains a promi-
nent feature of the imposition of the death penalty in the
state and federal courts, the challenge of meeting the im-
mense burden established in McCleskey for proving racial
discrimination must be accepted. Other instances of discrim-
ination must be identified and challenged. State constitu-
tional guarantees must be asserted as a basis for challenging
discrimination in the infliction of the death penalty.276
Silence about racial discrimination in capital cases will
only allow it to continue to fester. Wishful thinking cannot
take the place of dealing with reality. Decisions tolerating
racial discrimination must be assailed until, like Swain v. Al-
penalty at all, the choice mandated by the Constitution would be plain" since
racial disparities influenced by race would flagrantly violate[ ] the Court's prior
"insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable con-
sistency, or not at all." (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982)); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring
in judgment) ("the effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ulti-
mate sanction is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and the death penalty-
must be abandoned altogether').
275. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
276. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 465-68 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting a standard for analyzing claims of racial discrimination
in the infliction of the death penalty under the equal protection clause of the
Florida Constitution); Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 757-61 (Ga. 1994)
(Benham, J., dissenting) (asserting that admission of victim impact evidence
violates various provisions of the Georgia Constitution).
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abama, they are rejected and replaced with standards that
acknowledge and respond to the influence of racial prejudice
in the criminal courts in general and in capital cases in
particular.

